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STATE REGULATION OF OUT-OF-STATE GARBAGE
SUBJECT TO DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
REVIEW AND THE MARKET PARTICIPANT
EXCEPTION
INTRODUCTION

The image of "The Mobro," the notorious barge filled with New York
garbage, traveling up and down the East Coast in a futile attempt to find
a resting place for its cargo, exemplifies the landfill shortage that is
threatening our nation. 1 This shortage has forced many cities to haul
their garbage to distant landfills in other states.2 Often, hauling garbage
to other states is a short-term measure intended to handle garbage until
incinerators can be built and operated. 3 But alternatives such as incineration and recycling will not eliminate the need for landfills. Landfills will
be needed for the materials that cannot be recycled, for the ash that remains after burning, and for the garbage produced during the periods the
incinerators are shut down.4
The increase in out-of-state dumping has led to the enactment of legis1. Cook, Garbage Law: It's Not a Trashy Practice, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 1,
col. 1; see New York Public Int. Res. Group v. Town of Islip, 71 N.Y.2d 292, 520 N.E.2d
517, 525 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1988) (upholding consent order permitting an increase in the
height of the Islip town landfill and burial of ash in the landfill); see also Cook, supra, at
I, col. 4 (the nation's dump sites are reaching capacity and will run out of available
landfill space by the 1990s); see generally Bronstein, Garbage Landfills in Half of the
States Approaching Capacity, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1987, at A 20, col.1; Bunch, Trash
Over the Long Haul, Newsday, Dec. 14, 1987, at 6, col. 1; Rice, Where Will We Put That
Garbage, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Apr. 11, 1988, at 96, col. 1.
2. Bunch, supra note I, at 30, col. 1.See Cook, supra note 1, at 1, col. 4; Bronstein,
supra notel, at A20, col. 1; Rice, supra note 1, at 96, col. 2. Since 1980 the amount of
available landfill space has decreased nationwide. One study indicates that all but four
states are running out of suitable locations. Id. at 96, col. 1; see generally H.R. REP. No.
1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1491], reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6240 & 6247 (the lack of available landfill
space has forced cities to transport their garbage to distant out-of-state sites).
For example, on Long Island, New York, long distance hauling of garbage to distant
sites in the Midwest has increased significantly since 1984. Bunch, supra note 1, at 30, col.
1. This has resulted in enormous tax costs being levied on taxpayers in the exporting
towns. It is expected that by 1989 roughly half of Long Islands garbage will be hauled
out-of-state. Id. Despite attempts by Long Island townships to restrict long distance hauling, state officials have ruled that they have little choice because of a 1983 law restricting
landfill expansions. Id. The rationale for the law is that land burial and disposal poses a
significant threat to the quality of drinking water on Long Island. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 27-0704 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988).
Long Island's landfill problems are not different from those in other states. For example, in New Jersey several giant landfills were closed or restricted this past year. Bunch.
supra note 1, at 30, col. 1. It is expected that New Jersey will soon haul over half of the
garbage it produces. Id; see also Rice supra note 1, at 96, col. 2. In addition, local opposition to alternative forms of waste management has forced cities such as Boston and Philadelphia to haul garbage out-of-state. Id. See also Bronstein, supra note 1, at A20, col. 1.
3. Bunch, supra note 1, at 30, col. 1.
4. Id. Although a small amount of material is recycled, composted, or incinerated,
most solid waste is landfilled. Eisler, Throwing it Away in New Jersey: A Comprehensive
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lation meant to curb it. As more states restrict the importation of out-ofstate waste the incentive to haul garbage long distance will decrease. Discouraging the costly alternative of long-distance hauling' will reduce the
economic,6 environmental," and legal' burdens that long-distance hauling forces on residents in the recipient and exporting states.9 It will also
make states more responsible for their own garbage, thereby encouraging
them to develop safer environmental alternatives to solid waste dumping.' o Furthermore, it will prevent states from being forced to accept
look at waste disposal 17 (American Lung A. of N.J. with support from the N.J. Dep't of
Envtl. Protection, 1983).
5. Bunch, supra note 1, at 30, col. 2. See generally, H.R. REP. No.149 1, supra note
2, at 9 (long distance hauling and disposal of garbage is a costly alternative); id. (only
education and road construction surpass garbage disposal as the most expensive item in
the local budget); Rice, supra note 1,at 96, col. 2 (the cost of dumping has risen steeply);
Eisler, supra note 4, at 21 ("The cost of collecting and disposing of our.., solid waste
comes to about... $240 million to $400 million a year). Landfill dumping costs, commonly known as tipping fees, range from $1.06 to $4.65 a cubic yard).
6. Bunch. supra note 1, at 6, col. 1 (enormous tax bills, spread of pollution, and the
risk of future lawsuits to clean up out-of-state sites under Superfund legislation, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657)); see Eisler, supra note 4, at 22 ("There are also hidden
charges. The environmental costs of polluting our land, air, and water with materials
which could be recycled or reused, or burned for energy, or which never should have
entered the waste stream in the first place have never been calculated"). See infra notes 78 and accompanying text.
7. The high cost of hauling garbage long-distances has led trucking companies to
resort to the practice of "back-hauling". Bunch supra note 1, at 6, col. 1.
"Backhaulers" are truckers who haul foodstuff and consumer goods one way, and then
look to make money on their return trip by hauling garbage. Id. at 30, col. 1. Backhaulers
use both regular tractor trailers and refrigerated trailers designed to haul food products,
thereby creating potentially serious public health problems. Id. at 6, col. 1.
The garbage trucking industry is so new that federal, state, and local environmental
agencies have no specific laws or regulations to deal with backhauling. See id. at 31, col.
l("The lack of regulation of long distance garbage trucking is in sharp contrast to federal
rules on hazardous waste shipping," partially because of the large volumes involved and
because garbage is not toxic). See generally, Solid Waste Action Team (S.W.A.T.) monitoring of Fairfield Landfill, Amanda Ohio, statistical data (Fordham Environmental Law
Report File).
8. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), as amended by Act
of October 17, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE & CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2835, 2837 (States that export garbage will incur lawsuits if recipient landfills in other states later must be cleaned up under this legislation).
9. See Cook, supra note 1, at 32, col. 3 ("States have found themselves embroiled in
litigation [over] where to dump ... the trash"); Bronstein, supra note 1, at A20, col. 2.
("Public opposition has made it very difficult to create new landfills or ...expand old
ones"); Bunch, supra note 1, at 32, col. 4. (The mass exodus of garbage to landfills in
other states is robbing the recipient states of space in which to dump its own garbage, and
is discouraging aggressive recycling and reduction efforts by residents of these recipient
states).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (b)(8) (Supp. IV 1986) (alternative methods of land disposal
must be developed since states are running out of suitable solid waste disposal sites); H.R.
RE'. No. 1491, supra note 2, at 10 (advocating resource conservation by recycling materials); Solid Waste Management Act of 1988, 1988 N.Y. Laws 187 (McKinney) (state and
local solid waste management policy, focusing on alternatives to landfilling such as waste
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garbage from other states, thus reducing the likelihood that states will
use waste disposal as a political or economic bargaining chip in their
relations with other states."
Although the Federal government, pursuant to its powers under the
commerce clause'2, has regulated garbage in the past,' 3 it has taken the
position that garbage is a matter more appropriately handled at the state
and local levels.' 4 This does not mean, however, that states have unbridled discretion in regulating solid waste disposal. On the contrary, there
are limitations imposed on both state and local government by what has
been termed the "dormant" commerce clause."
reduction, recycling, and incineration); see generally, Cook, supra note 1, at 33-34 (states
are establishing waste reduction and clean-up programs, as well as encouraging recycling
efforts and trash to energy incinerators); Bronstein, supra note 1, at A20, col. 3-5 (burn,
recycle, waste reduction); Bunch, supra note 1, at 32, col. 3-4 (land entrepreneurs plan to
convert abandoned coal mines to solid waste disposal facilities, and use railroad cars and
barges to ship the garbage); Rice, supra note I, at 98, col. 2, & 100, col. 1-2 (garbage to
energy plants (mass-bum incineration) and recycling efforts).
11. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). In City of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court struck down a New Jersey state statute banning out-of-state
waste because it exceeded a state's power to regulate waste under the commerce clause.
Dicta in the case supports an interpretation of the commerce clause that will allow states
to send their waste into other states whenever the sending states find it "expedient or
necessary to do so." cf. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 443 (1980) (embargo may be
retaliated by embargo and commerce would be halted at state lines); Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 458 (1946) (the commerce clause does not give states the right to use
other states as a dumping ground by importing into other states "whatever one may

please").
12. U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 8. Garbage is considered a "good" in interstate commerce
and merits protection under the Commerce Clause. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978).
13. Congress has acknowledged the threat to public health and welfare posed by the
problem of solid waste by enacting the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(hereinafter R.C.R.A.] Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (Supp. lV 1986)). This statute typifies a flaw present in most of the
federal regulations in that it serves to address the problem of hazardous waste as opposed
to solid waste. The regulatory provisions of R.C.R.A. are restricted to the toxic subclass
of solid wastes categorized as "hazardous wastes." See id. §§ 6921-6939. The problem of
non-hazardous municipal and industrial solid waste is attacked using an incentives system, whereby the granting of federal funds is conditioned upon a state's implementation
of solid waste disposal plans complying with minimum federal standards. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6941-6949 ( Supp. IV 1986). Moreover, the federal guidelines pursuant to subchapter
four, Solid Waste, are not mandatory upon the states, whereas the subchapter three, Hazardous Waste, guidelines are mandatory. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6949.
The federal government, until now active in regulating mostly hazardous waste, is contemplating a larger role in the disposal of ordinary solid waste. Cook, supra note 1,at 32,
col. 1-2.
14. See, e.g., R.C.R.A., 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1982) (Congress finds with respect to
solid waste "that while the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be
primarily the function of State, regional and local agencies, the problems of waste disposal.., have become a matter national in scope and in concern and necessitate Federal
action.., to reduce the amount of waste ... and to provide for proper and economical
solid waste disposal practices."
15. The limitations or negative implications of the commerce clause have alternatively been referred to as the "dormant" commerce clause, See, e.g. White v. Massachu-
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There are two primary review standards by which the courts have analyzed environmental statutes regulating the importation of out-of-state
waste under the dormant commerce clause: a "heightened scrutiny" review16, and a "balancing of interests" review. 7 In addition, certain environmental statutes stand outside the scope of constitutional inquiry
because of the "market participant exception" to the dormant commerce
clause."8 Recent case law indicates that state and local governments can
successfully restrict out-of-state garbage if they satisfy a balancing of interests standard of review under the dormant commerce clause' 9 or become market participants 20 in the solid waste landfill market.
This Note examines these two methods of restricting out-of-state
waste. Part I offers a brief overview of the commerce clause and discusses
how it relates to the problem of garbage disposal. Part 11 analyzes the two
review standards by which the courts have analyzed state regulation of
out-of-state waste under dormant commerce clause analysis. This Note
then examines the market participant exception to commerce clause review. Finally, this Note compares the balancing test with the market participant exception and argues that states who achieve market participant
status can more successfully restrict out-of-state waste than states who
try to satisfy the balancing test.

I.

AFFIRMATIVE AND DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS

The commerce clause of the United States Constitution grants Con'2
gress power "to regulate Commerce . . .among the several States." 1
The primary purpose of the commerce clause is to ensure cooperation
among the states in the area of interstate trade.2 2 The framers wanted to
avoid the economic isolation and division that had plagued relations
among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
Confederation.2 3
The power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes
the power to regulate the local movement of goods traveling within interstate commerce in both the states of origin and destination, which might
setts Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983) (scrutinizing a Boston city
hiring policy for commerce clause violation), or "negative" commerce clause. See Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause and the New Federalism: The
Case of DiscriminatoryState Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-State Tax Exempt Bonds,
31 VAND.L.REv. 473 (1978). These limitations were recognized in City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
16. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 54-82 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 54-82 and accompanying text.

21. U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8.
22. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
23. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979); See H.P. Hood, 336 U.S. at
533-34; Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
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have a substantial and harmful effect upon commerce. 24 Though the language of the commerce clause, as written, explicitly grants power to Congress, it has long been recognized that this grant of power implicitly
limits the authority of the states in the area of interstate commerce.25
This limitation placed on the states has come to be known as the "dormant commerce clause."'26 The limitation imposed by the dormant commerce clause on state regulatory power is not absolute, and states retain
authority under their general police powers to regulate matters of "legitimate local concern," even though interstate commerce may be affected.2 7
Yet even in regulating local concerns, the state may not put itself in a
position of economic isolation.2" More specifically, the dormant commerce clause operates to ensure that our nation's economic system and
freedom in interstate trade will not be jeapordized by states acting as
independent and self-interested economic actors.2 9
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,3" the United States Supreme
Court held that garbage was an item of commerce 31 and struck down a
New Jersey statute which prohibited the importation of garbage which
originated outside the state.32 Despite having a legitimate environmental
24. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclam. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
25. See C.T.S. Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87, (1987); Lewis v.
BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 326 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978); H.P. Hood,
336 U.S. at 534-38; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852).
26. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 213
(1983); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) ("The bounds of
these [dormant commerce clause] restraints appear nowhere in the words of the Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of this [Supreme] Court giving
effect to its basic purpose"). See also H.P. Hood, 336 U.S. at 539; Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945); see generally Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960) (the dormant commerce clause limitations apply with
equal force to all laws and regulations that effect interstate commerce, whether at the
state, county, or municipal level).
27. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960) (state
regulation validly based on the police power does not impermissibly burden interstate
commerce where the regulation neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor
operates to disrupt its required uniformity). See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (general police powers); See also Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970); Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980); Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories
Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
28. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
29. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 12 (1986).
30. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
31. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 622 ("All objects of interstate
trade merit Commerce Clause protection").
32. 437 U.S. at 627 (1978). See generally, Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). State statutes prohibiting the importation of most out-of-state waste are not preempted by the Solid Waste Disposal Act, other provisions of federal law, or because of
general incompatability with federal objectives. Rather, such statutes are violative of the
commerce clause because they impose on sending states the full burden of conservng the
recipient state's landfill space. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT

[Vol. I

purpose in conserving its own landfill space and thereby easing its solid
waste disposal problems, the Court held that New Jersey's discrimination
against out-of-state garbage had exceeded the limitations imposed by the
dormant commerce clause.3 3 The Court's decision in City of Philadelphia reversed a trend spanning a few decades, in which the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts had allowed for the conservation of resources by states even though interstate commerce was incidentally burdened.3 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia, by
concluding its analysis without balancing New Jersey's state interest,
abandoned its long-established sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
the states.35
There is a recent trend of cases in which the courts have recognized
constitutional ways for states to restrict out-of-state waste that differ
from the total ban on out-of-state waste struck down in City of Philadelphia. States are able to regulate against interstate commerce without vio"even-handed"
lating the dormant commerce clause by use of both
37
regulations 36 and the market participant exception.
(1978); see also H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 2, at 3 (State movement to ban the
importation of waste have raised serious questions concerning restraint of trade and interference with interstate commerce).
New York's highest court has ruled that local laws making municipal landfills offlimits to waste generated outside the town's borders are valid so long as they do not
prohibit waste from out-of-state. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of
Caledonia, 51 N.Y.2d 679, 684-85, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968-69, 417 N.E.2d 78 (1980); See
also Dutchess Sanitation Service, Inc. v. Town of Plattekill, 51 N.Y.2d 670; 435 N.Y.S.2d
962, 417 N.E.2d 74 (1980).
33. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
34. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (as a market participant, a
cement plant owned by South Dakota may favor in-state customers during a cement
shortage); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (upheld Maryland
regulatory scheme which favored in-state sale of auto hulks); Const. Indus. A. of Sonoma
County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934
(1976) (ban on further building); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (ban on phosphate detergents).
35. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (upheld state's police
power in regulation of out-of-state activities damaging the state's environment); Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee. 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (upholding state's public nuisance action to enjoin
acts beyond their territorial limits impacting on their environment); see also Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (undertook a balancing test to strike down state
statute prohibiting operation of trains with more than fourteen passenger cars or seventy
freight cars); see generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (established general rule that where a state "statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits").
36. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 54-82 and accompanying text.
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
RESTRICTING OUT-OF-STATE WASTE UNDER THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

A.

"Heightened Scrutiny" Review

"Heightened scrutiny" or "strict scrutiny"3 is the standard of review
for state regulatory measures that discriminate against interstate commerce.39 Even if the regulation deals primarily with matters of local concern, heightened scrutiny is applied if the measure is protectionist in
nature." Included in this test is a determination of whether the state
statute advances a legitimate state purpose. 4 ' A statute may withstand
heightened scrutiny review if the state or local government provides a
sufficient reason for the discrimination, such as a legitimate state
38. The Court uses the term "strictest scrutiny" alternatively with "heightened scrutiny." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
39. A statute that "overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a state's borders" falls most easily into the "heightened" scrutiny category. City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). In such cases, a "virtual per se" rule of unconstitutionality is applied. South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,
(1984); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624 (1978).
40. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (discriminatory
on its face); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (neutral on its face
but discriminatory in purpose); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (neutral on its face but discriminatory in effect). Environmental
acts which merely burden (without discriminating against) interstate commerce are not
per se invalid under City of Philadelphia,see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981), and will be scrutinized under the Balancing of Interests Review. See infra
notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is no bright line distinction between the
"discriminatory effects" of state regulation held per se invalid under the commerce clause
in Hunt and "incidental burdens" of state regulation to which the balancing approach is
applied. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S.
573, 579 (1986). A finding that state regulation constitutes "economic protectionism" can
be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. 468 U.S.
263 (1984), or discriminatory effect, Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 471 n. 15; City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
The rationale for applying a heightened scrutiny analysis to state regulations which
disproportionately burden out-of-state interests relates to the adequacy of the political
process. The State's political processes have less incentive to check state regulation when
the burden falls mainly on out-of-state interests. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 632
F.Supp. 1225, 1233 n.14 (D. Del. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 388 (3rd Cir. 1987). See Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-76 (1981).
41. Washington State Bldg.-& Const. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 631
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983). See also, Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888) (public health); Huron Portland Cement Co. v City
of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (same); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 473 (1981) (promotion of the conservation of energy and environmental protection); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 256 (1908) (protection of health of people and
animals).
In contrast, statutes with illegitimate or non-existent justifications inherently discriminate against out-of-state interests and will be struck down automatically without further
inquiry. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949) (milkpurchasing licenses); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (minnows); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 598-600 (1923) (natural gas).
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purpose.42
In each instance where the Supreme Court has struck down a state law
under a "heightened scrutiny" review, it was confronted with a law that
imposed a total ban on imported or exported goods. 43 This ban had the
effect of precluding interstate commerce of a particular good while leaving unaffected the intra-state trade of that good. Thus, the Court's decisions indicate that "heightened scrutiny" only applies when there is
discrimination against interstate versus intra-state movement of goods
and not when there is discrimination solely against a good itself". For
instance, the Court in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey indicated that
New Jersey could preserve its available landfill space by restricting the
flow of all waste into its landfills, regardless of origin, even though incidental burdens on interstate commerce might result.4 5 When states pursue such regulations "evenhandedly" to effectuate a legitimate public
interest, the courts proceed from the "heightened scrutiny" review to the
"balancing of interests" review."
42. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-627 (1978) (New Jersey
statute which placed the burden of conserving the state's remaining landfill space on outof-state commercial interests was held to be discriminatory despite a legitimate legislative
purpose). The Court stated that the legislative purpose was irrelevant to its constitutionality because the "evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends." Id. at 626. States must demonstrate a close fit between burden on interstate
commerce and the asserted legitimate local purposes. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982).
43. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 617 (banning out of state
waste from New Jersey landfills, but not similarly restricting disposal of New Jersey
waste); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (barred exports of Oklahoma minnows
but allowed for in-state sales).
44. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626; see also Norfolk Southern
Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 401 (3rd Cir. 1987).
45. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626 (1978).
46. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.137, 142 (1970); Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
Cases involving state highway safety regulation come under a third category of review:
a deferential review standard. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 405 (3rd
Cir. 1987). See also Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675 (1981).
Special deference is accorded highway safety regulations on the assumption that the burden of facially even-handed highway safety regulations usually fall on in-state as well as
out-of-state interests, thus providing a political check on unduly burdensome regulations.
Kassel, 450 U.S. at 675 (citing Raymond Motor Transport., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,

444 n.18 0978)).
Use of a deferential review standard for highway safety regulation results in a presumption of validity stronger than the "balancing of interests" review under Pike. Norfolk
Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225, 1233 (D. Del. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 388
(3rd Cir. 1987). The extent of this presumption, however, remains unsettled. Id. See Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 523-24 (1959) (grouping highway regulation with
other categories of regulation, but employing the balancing test). Uncertainty about the
use of a deferential review standard for highway safety regulation in American Trucking
Associations v. Larson, 683 F.2d 787 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982),
weakens the applicabilty of the deferential approach in other contexts. See Norfolk
Southern Corp., 632 F. Supp. 1225, 1233 (D. Del. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 388 (3rd Cir.
1987).
The Supreme Court has not applied the deferential review standard to nondiscrimina-
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"Balancingof Interests" Review

States that regulate the importation of out-of-state garbage may be
able to avoid a commerce clause violation by satisfying a balancing test
under dormant commerce clause analysis. The first part of the balancing
test requires that the ordinance: 1) regulate evenhandedly; 2) effectuate a
legitimate local public interest; 3) have only an incidental effect on interstate commerce; and 4) not burden commerce excessively in relation to
the local benefits.4 7 Assuming that the state statute meets each of these
requirements, the Court then considers the nature of the local interest
involved and whether the local interest could be promoted with a less
discriminatory impact on interstate commerce.4 s
States attempting to restrict out-of-state garbage welcomed the recent
Ninth circuit ruling in Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv.
Dist.49 The Evergreen court ruled that the Portland, Oregon metropolitan government (The District), in order to extend the life of its landfill,
tory environmental statutes. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
472 (1981) (applying balancing test). Lower courts have also resorted to use of the balancing test to review state statutes in the environmental area. See Evergreen Waste Systems
v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist. 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987); Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. Town
of Goshen, 556 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982).
47. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit. 362 U.S. 440, 443; see also Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482, 1484; Washington State Bldg. and Const. Trades Council
v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630-631 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
48. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); See Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (where a state law or regulation discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of local interests, the burden falls
on the state to justify it in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the
unavailability of non-discriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interest at
stake).
For the past two decades the Supreme Court has primarily used a balancing test to
decide whether state regulations impose an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.
Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing 96 YALE L.J. 943, 966 (1987).
The balancing test articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc is most prominant in dormant commerce clause cases. Id.
The Supreme Court has applied the Pike balancing test to state regulation designed to
protect the environment. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225, 1239 (D.
Del. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 388 (3rd Cir. 1987). See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); The balancing approach now prevails for evenhanded regulations. See Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Arkansas Public Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 389-394
(1983).
In a review of the dormant commerce clause cases Professor Regan has argued that a
careful reading of the "movement of goods" cases demonstrates that, despite what it is
saying, the Court is not balancing. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1094-95 (1986).
Instead, Professor Regan argues that the dormant commerce clause is concerned primarily with purposeful economic protectionism. Id. Professor Aleinikoff has argued that in
balancing the Court ignores analysis of text, precedent, and ethical tradition that is the
usual stuff of constitutional interpretation. Aleinkoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. at 988.
49. Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir.
1987).
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could restrict private haulers from nearby Washington state without violating the commerce clause.' The court noted that, unlike the ban on
out-of-state waste struck down in City of Philadelphia,the District's ordinance applied to only one of Oregon's many landfills and barred waste
from most Oregon counties as well as from out-of-state.5
"[E]venhandedness," the court held, "requires simply that out-of-state
waste be treated no differently from most Oregon waste."'52 Thus, the
District's
ordinance satisfied the dormant commerce clause balancing
53
test.
III.

MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION (STATE PLANNING)

A.

Case Law

Whether or not a state statute satisfies the balancing test, the state may
still regulate interstate commerce if it does so under the market participant exception to the dormant commerce clause. 5
The Supreme Court has held that a state or local government is not
subject to the restrictions of the commerce clause when it acts as a "market participant" as opposed to a "market regulator." '5 Nothing in the
commerce clause prohibits a state, in the absence of congressional action,
from participating in the market and thereby favoring its own citizens
50. Id. at 1485.
51. ld at 1484; See also Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Goshen, 556 F.Supp. 231
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982); Borough of Glassboro v. Gloucester
County Bd., 100 NJ. 134, 495 A.2d 49, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985).
In 41 Turi
Landfill, the court upheld a local ordinance restricting waste from outside the town's
borders. The court quoted the Pike test and found that the ordinance was evenhanded
and effected a substantial local interest. In Glassboro, a New Jersey statute enjoining use
of a New Jersey landfill by all but three New Jersey counties was upheld by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. The court in Glassboro distinguished City of Philadelphia,noting
that the injunction in the present case was unrelated to the garbage's place of origin. 495
A.2d at 55.
52. Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th
Cir. 1987) citing Washington State Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d
627, 631 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); See also Loretto Winery Ltd. v.
Gazzara, 601 F.Supp. 850 modified, 761 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1985) (prohibiting sales of all
wine products containing grapes grown outside of New York); Waste Aid Systems v.
Citrus County, Florida, 613 F. Supp 102 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (county ordinance limiting
available landfills was deemed even-handed even though it may foreclose the most cost
efficient one); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 93-94 (1987) (evenhanded statute reducing number of interstate transactions is not invalid).
53. Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482,1485 (9th

Cir. 1987).
54. See infra notes 55-82 and accompanying text.
55. White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983);
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980). The Court in Reeves, Inc. referred to market-participant action
as "state proprietary activity." 447 U.S. at 439 Recent legislative proposals by States have
applied the "market-participant" exception under the guise of State Planning. If state or
state subdivision acts as a market-participant rather than a market regulator the commerce clause does not "require independent justification" for any protectionist measure.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 809.
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over others.5 6 Judicial restraint in this area is counseled by policy considerations of state sovereignty,"' the role of each state "as guardian and
trustee" for its people,58 fairness, 9 and the fact that a state, like a private
business, should not be governed by the commerce clause when it enters
the private market.' °
The Court first enunciated the market participant exception to the
Commerce Clause in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,6 and significantly expanded it in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake.6 2 In Reeves, the state of
South Dakota limited the sale of cement from a state-owned plant to
Dakota residents during a time of shortage.63 The Court held that the
resident-preference program did not violate the commerce clause because
64
Dakota was acting as a market participant in the cement market.
The decision in Reeves, Inc. rested on the Court's determination that
cement is the end product of a "complex process," not a natural re-

source. 65 Dictum in Reeves, Inc. suggested that the market participant
exception would not apply in cases involving the hoarding of natural resources and implied that landfill sites were a natural resource."

Thus, a

state wishing to restrict the inflow of waste into its landfill sites under the
market participant exception may be required to characterize the solid
waste landfill facility as a complex process, rather than as a natural resource. 67 Because many waste disposal facilities are highly regulated,
56.. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
57. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980).
58. Id. at 438 (1980) (quoting Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903)).
59. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. at 446 (Reversal would discourage similar state projects because of the fear that other states would reap the benefits of its foresight, risk, and industry).
60. Id. at 438-39 (quoting U.S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
61. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (upheld Maryland regulatory scheme which favored in-state sale of auto hulks).
62. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980) (as market participant, cement
plant owned by South Dakota may favor in-state customers during cement shortage). See
also White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983) (The
court upheld Boston's 50% local hiring quotas on construction projects funded by the
city).
63. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. at 432-33 (1980).
64. Id. at 446.
65. Id. at 443-44 & n. 16 (analogizing the cement plant to a railroad, mill, or irrigation
system).,
66. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978), the Court struck
down a New Jersey statute that limited access to all publicly and privately owned land
located in the state upon which landfills could be constructed. The Court reasoned that
the statute "imposed on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving
the State's remaining landfill space." Id. It was in this context that the Court implied that
landfill sites were natural resources. The Court in Reeves, Inc. recognized the possibility
that "exemption for marketplace participation necessarily admits of [some] exceptions."
447 U.S. at 440 (1980). In upholding the market participant exception, the Court noted
that "South Dakota has not sought to limit access to the State's limestone or other materials used to make cement. Nor has it restricted the ability of private firms or sister States
to set up plants within its borders." Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 444.
67. See Cain, Routes and Roadblocks.: State Controlson Hazardous Waste Imports, 23
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costly, and provide leachate control and other public services to state
residents,6 8 such a characterization would not be improper.69
Athough the Supreme Court has not yet specifically recognized the
market participant exception in the solid waste landfill market, 0 lower
federal courts and state courts have recognized this exception in a
number of recent decisions." In County Commissioners of Charles
County v. Stevens," the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the
question of landfill services in the context of a private refuse hauler's
challenge to a county ordinance prohibiting the disposal of out-of-county
waste at a county-owned landfill.7 3 The court referred to the dicta in
Reeves, Inc. and concluded that its landfill was not a natural resource
and thus was not subject to any natural resource exception to the market
participant rule.7 4 The rationale behind this decision was that the county
was not trying to hoard land but, rather, was preserving the benefits of a
waste processing service for its residents. It accomplished this by providing by a costly, highly regulated waste disposal facility constructed and
operated with tax revenues collected from its own citizens.' Therefore,
the market involved was landfill services, and the market participant exception could be applied. 76
J. 767, 792 (characterizing waste disposal as a "production process...
could be determinative before the courts").
68. Evergreen Waste System. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 132 (D.
Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987). Leachate involves the surface or subsurface runoff of discarded materials from inadequately designed landfill facilities. Such discarded materials consist of solid waste, semi-solid waste and sludge reduced to its liquid
and gaseous forms. Leachate often results in contamination of underground water supplies, See H.R. REP. No. 1491, reprinted in, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6240, 6248, 6256-57, 6276.
69. See Evergreen Waste Systems. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 132
(D. Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987) (complex metropolitan landfill operation is not a natural resource to which commerce clause scrutiny should apply).
70. The Court in City of Philadelphiahad an opportunity to foreclose this possibility
but specifically left it open in a footnote. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 627 n.6. It expressed no opinion "about New Jersey's power, consistent with the
Commerce Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state owned resources... or
New Jersey's power to spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents and business."
71. Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist. 643 F.Supp 127, 131 (D.
Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987). See, e.g., Shayne Bros. v. District of
Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984) (upholding District of Columbia health
regulation prohibiting disposal of "out-of-state" waste in District facilities); County Commissioners of Charles County v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 216, 473 A.2d 12, 19, (1984) (upholding ban on deposit of "extra county" waste in county owned landfill).
72. County Commissioners of Charles County v. Stevens 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12
NAT. RESOURCES

0984).
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id.
76. County Commissioners of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 19 (1984); accord Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. District, 643 F. Supp.127,132 (D.
Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987); Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592
F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984).
The district court in Evergreen referred to Reeves. Inc. and rejected Evergreen's argu-

1989]

REGULATION OF OUT-OF-STA TE GARBAGE

111

In Lefrancois v. State of R.I.,"' the federal district court held that a
state statute banning out-of-state waste from a state-subsidized landfill
served a legitimate public purpose in providing for the safe disposal of
solid waste, and represented a reasonable and necessary measure to preserve limited landfill space, within the context of a comprehensive waste
management plan."' The State of Rhode Island, by subsidizing and operating the only landfill in the state, did not become a participant in a natural resources market in landfill sites, for which the commerce clause
would require an unfettered market, but rather a participant in the market for landfill services."9 Although the court in Lefrancois did not follow the dicta in Reeves by characterizing its landfill as a complex process,
it specifically followed Stevens in recognizing that the state was a participant in a landfill services market, not a natural resource market.8 °
ment that the ordinance was protectionist. Thus the Evergreen court held that there could
be no exception to the market participant doctrine in this case. Evergreen Waste Systems
v. Metropolitan Serv. District, 643 F. Supp. at 128 & 131 (D. Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d
1482 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980)). The Court in
Reeves, Inc. conceded that a state was protectionist only in the sense that it limited benefits generated by a state program to its citizens. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442
(1980) cited in Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. District, 643 F. Supp. 127,
131 (D. Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cit. 1987).
Analogizing the present situation in Evergreen to that in Reeves, Inc. the district court
in Evergreen stated that a publicly-owned landfill provided a service to in-state haulers
just as other governmental units provided services, such as "schools and police", to its
citizens. Evergreen Waste Systems, 643 F.Supp. at 131 (D. Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d
1482 (9th Cir. 1987); see Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F.Supp. 1128, 1134
(D.D.C. 1984).
The Ninth Circuit in Evergreen, after concluding that the Ordinance satisfied the "balancing of interests" review, did not proceed to consider whether the ordinance also satisfied the market participant exception. Evergreen Waste Systems, 820 F.2d at 1485 (9th
Cit. 1987).
77. Lefrancois v. State of R.I., 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
78. Id. at 1215, 1217.
79. Lefrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1211. The court noted that Rhode Island had not
precluded any party, in-state or foreign, from purchasing property upon which to construct a sanitary landfill site (natural resource) open to all Waste regardless of origin. Id.
80. Id. An argument can be made that state restrictions of out of state waste may
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985) (Alabama violated the Equal Protection Clause by taxing
out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate than domestic insurance companies).
Not all regulations, however, that disfavor out-of-staters will be found invalid under the
equal protection clause. All that is required to avoid an equal protection violation is a
rational relation between the regulation chosen by the state and the attainment of a legitimate state purpose. State statutes restricting out-of-state waste would have little difficulty
meeting these tests because the minimization of out-of-state waste diminishes the economic, environmental and legal problems that out-of-state waste forces on residents in
the recipient states. See supra notes 6-8.
One other argument that may be raised is that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (Low-Level Act) permits states to form interstate compacts to prohibit the importation of low-level radioactive waste generated outside their borders. Pub.L. No. 99-240,
99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d),(a)(2) (A)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). The
Act appears to grant the authority to exclude out-of-state low-level radioactive waste to
compacts, not to individual states. See Washington State Bldg. & Const. Trades Council
v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.
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Although the New Jersey statute declared unconstitutional in Philadelphia applied to all in-state landfills, both public and private, while the
Rhode Island statute upheld in Lefrancois applied only to the state-subsidized landfill, both statutes effectively closed their respective state's borders to out-of-state waste. 8' However, the fact that the Rhode Island
statute applied solely to a state funded landfill was, for purposes of com-

merce clause scrutiny, a critical distinction."2 The statute in Philadelphia
applied to all public and private landfills in New Jersey. Thus, out-ofstate haulers were not only excluded from using the waste processing
services available at existing publicly-owned landfills, but were effectively
prohibited from purchasing new landfill space to meet their needs. The
Rhode Island statute, in contrast, merely restricted the use of a state
service, without any restriction on the acquisition or use of private
landfills.
B.

Legislative Enactments

In light of recent case law, legislatures in other states besides Rhode

Island (Lefrancois), Maryland (Stevens), and Oregon (Evergreen) have attempted to prohibit or limit the receipt of out-of-state garbage under
state and local laws which not only may avoid commerce clause scrutiny
under the market participant exception but also may satisfy dormant

commerce clause limitations by satisfying the balancipg of interests
standard."3
In Pennsylvania, for example, the legislature recently enacted a com-

1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 913 1983). By analogy, one may argue that interstate compacts, acting as market participants, could prohibit the importation of solid waste. Congress has previously encouraged states to form compacts to facilitate solid waste disposal.
42 U.S.C. § 6904 (a),(b) (1982).
The Supreme Court recently held that there is no market participant exception to the
privileges and immunities clause. The Court reached this conclusion in ruling that the
Clause applied to a town ordinance which required that at least 40% of the work force on
any construction project funded by the city must reside in the city. United Bldg. and
Const. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
The rationale for a market participant exception in the privileges and immunities context is not nearly as strong as in the Commerce Clause context. The Commerce Clause
deals only with regulation, and a state acting as market partipant is simply not regulating.
But the Privileges and Immunities Clause bars any type of state conduct, regulatory or
otherwise, which discriminates against out-of-staters on matters of fundamental concern.
It is unlikely that Boston's local hiring rule, upheld against commerce clause attack (via
-the market participant exception) in White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983), would also have survived a privileges and immunities attack, had
one been made. The privileges and immunities issue was not raised by opponents of the
regulation in that case.
81. Lefrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1208.
82. Id.
83. See Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act ("Act 101 of
1988"), 1988 Pa. Legis. Serv. 391 (Purdon)(to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 303,
502); Ohio Am. Sub. H.B. 592, 1988 OHIO LEGis. BULL. 498, 500 & 527 (Anderson) (to
be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 343.01, 3734.52 (A),(B)(l)(2), 3734.53 (A),
(C)(l)(a)-(f), 3734.54 (A) 3734.57 (A)(2)(3), (B)(1)(2X3).
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prehensive solid waste management program to address the problems
caused by a lack of regulatory control and planning for the landfilling of
solid wastes.8 4 This Pennsylvania legislation, entitled the Municipal
Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act 5 (hereinafter the
"Act") allows local governments to enact ordinances which limit or restrict the amount of waste deposited in its landfills. In this way, the local
government is not regulating the landfill market, but rather is acting like
a private party participating within the landfill market.8 6 Thus, this legislation may avoid commerce clause scrutiny by fitting under the market
participant exception. 7
In order for a local government (county) to become a market participant by assuming public ownership of a solid waste landfill facility, it
must expressly state its intention and provide an explanation for its decision based on a comparative cost-benefit analysis of private ownership or
operation.18 The Act also empowers a county to implement an approved
county plan regarding the processing and disposal of the county's waste
and enables the county to plan for the processing and disposal of out-ofcounty waste.8 9 Furthermore, the Act allows the county to limit or restrict the processing or disposal of waste generated or produced outside
the county borders where such out-of-county waste contributes to a capacity shortage. 9
These measures taken by the state of Pennsylvania are mindful of the
limitations imposed by the dormant commerce clause. 9' They too, attempt to promote needed restrictions of out-of-state garbage by fitting
under the market participant exception. 92
Just as in the State of Pennsylvania, the State of Ohio recently enacted
a comprehensive solid waste management act. 93 The Ohio Act presented
ways to prohibit the receipt of out-of-state waste. 94 This was accomplished through the use of local planning districts composed of counties
84. 1988 Pa. Legis. Serv. 391 (Purdon) (to be codified at

PA. STAT. ANN.

87. Id.
88. 1988 Pa. Legis. Serv. 391(Purdon) (to be codified at PA.

STAT. ANN.

1904).
85. Id. §§ 101(a)(1O), 303.
86. See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text.

§§ 101-

§§ 502 (m)).

89. Id. § 303 (a)(2)(3).
90. Id. §§ 303 (a), 304 (a).
91. See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text. It is significant to note that the
Act, as originally constructed, would have given counties much greater control over garbage disposal, including the power to ban out-of-state waste. Bunch, supra note 1, at 32,
col. 2. However, this provision was striken because the State Attorney General determined that it would violate the interstate commerce clause.
92. See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text.
93. Ohio Am. Sub. H.B. 592, 1988 OHIo LEGIS. BULL. 498, 500 & 527 (Anderson)
(to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 343.01, 3734.52 (A), (B)(1)(2), 3734.53

(A),(C)(1) (a)-(f), 3734.54 (A), 3734.57 (A)(2X3), (B)(l)(2)(3)).
94. Ohio Am. Sub. H.B. 592, 1988 OHIO LEGIs. BULL. 498, 500 & 527 (Anderson)
(to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.132(A); see id. §§ 343.01 (F)(1),
3734.53 (C)(1).
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or groups of counties (joint counties) who developed suitable local plans
to deal with the garbage problem.9 5 Significantly, however, the Governor
of Ohio vetoed certain sections of this Act which allegedly violated the
federal Constitution.96
IV.

COMPARISON OF THE BALANCING APPROACH USED BY THE

NINTH CRcurr IN Evergreen and the Market Participant
Exception
The market participant exception has allowed states to restrict out-ofstate garbage while avoiding dormant commerce clause scrutiny. 97 The
balancing test, on the other hand, requires a balancing of federal rights
under the dormant commerce clause and state interests. 98
Any type of balancing test is problematic, requiring the court to weigh
competing interests and consider less discriminatory alternatives.99 The
inherent subjectivity of such an approach is exemplified by the court's
task of determining whether the burdens imposed on commerce are
"clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. '""°° As the
current landfill crisis deepens, and subsequent litigation over solid waste
disposal increases, the Supreme Court should have sufficient impetus to
further delineate when a regulation is a "burden" on interstate
commerce.101
In contrast to the balancing approach, the market participant exception is a less problematic method of restricting the inflow of out-of-state
waste. By avoiding dormant commerce clause scrutiny, market participants can restrict out-of-state waste without fear that other states will use
commerce clause freedom to export waste for disposal into its state
whenever it felt it "expedient or necessary" to do so." 2
State or local governments can become market participants by building waste disposal facilities providing a waste processing service for its
95. Id. §§ 343.01, 3734.52 (A), 3734.53 (AXC)(1), 3734.54 (A).
96. The Governor of Ohio vetoed that section of the bill which allowed districts to
prohibit and limit the receipt of out-of-state solid waste. Id. § 3734.132(A). In addition,
the Governor vetoed that section of the bill which placed a $75.00 per ton surcharge on
out-of-state solid waste disposed in Ohio. § 3734.57 (A)(3). The Governor concluded that
these sections would be held constitutionally invalid under the Interstate Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. See Ohio Governor's Veto Message (June 24,
1988), Am. Sub. H.B. 592.
97. See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
99. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
100. Id Virtually all state regulation involves increased costs for those doing business
within the state, including out-of-state interests doing business in the states as well as instate interests. In the absolute sense, virtually all state regulation "burdens" interstate
commerce. Where the "burden" on out-of-state interests is no different from that placed
on competing in-state interests, however, it is a burden on commerce rather than a burden on interstate commerce. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 406 (3rd
Cir. 1987).
101. Cook, supra note 1, at 33, col. 1.
102. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
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citizens. 10 3 Under this approach, state or local governments may need to
show that its waste processing service is the product of a complex process
and not merely a natural resource to which commerce clause scrutiny
would apply."°4 Considering that most modem waste disposal facilities
are costly, highly regulated, and complex operations, states should not
have much difficulty meeting this test.10 5
CONCLUSION

The increasing shortage of landfill space has forced many states to
search for available landfill space outside of their own borders. This effort
has led to the recent practice of long distance hauling of garbage.
Restricting out-of-state waste would lessen the incentive to haul garbage long distance and thereby reduce many of its associated problems.
Long distance hauling is robbing recipient states of space to dump their
own garbage and is discouraging aggressive recycling and reduction efforts by residents in these recipient states."' Furthermore, long distance
hauling of garbage is making it increasingly expensive for taxpayers in
these exporting towns, 0 7 who also run the risk of indirectly paying at a
later date for environmental cleanup under the Superfund legislation.' 0 8
A beneficial aspect of a reduction in long distance hauling would be the
development of alternative solutions to solid waste management, which
would also make states more responsible for their own garbage
problems. 0
In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey the United States Supreme Court
set forth guidelines clearly stating that any state legislation which bans
all out-of-state garbage necessarily violates the dormant commerce
clause.1 10 Yet subsequent lower courts have analyzed state and local
statutes that employ various measures to restrict out-of-state waste and
deemed them constitutional. These courts indicate that if state or local
103. County Commissioners of Charles County v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12,
19-20 (1984); See Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127,
131 (D. Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987); see also, Lefrancois v. State of
R.I., 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (the state has entered the market for landfill services and is
therefore not a participant in the natural resource market).
104. Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 132 (D.
Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987); See County Commissioners of Charles
County v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12, 20 (1984) (the service provided by the
county landfill is the "end product of a complex process"); Cain, Routes and Roadblocks:
State Controls on Hazardous Waste imports, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 767, 792 (characterizing waste disposal as a "production process ... could be determinative before the
courts").
105. County Commissioners of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 20 (1984);
Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 132 (D. Or.
1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987).
106. See Bunch, supra note 1, at 32, col. 4.
107. See supra note 5.
108. See supra note 8.
109. See supra note 10.
110. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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governments pursue "even-handed" regulations pursuant to the balancing of interests review standard... or become market participants 1 2 in
the solid waste landfill markets, they can regulate the inflow of out-ofstate waste without violating the dormant commerce clause.11 3
Although states should be able to restrict garbage by either one of
these methods, the market participant exception provides a less problematic approach. It avoids the subjective balancing method that often yields
uncertain results. It also prevents states from using-the freedom to export
garbage under
the commerce clause as a "sword to obtain a
1 14
preference."

The market participant exception provides a more certain way for
states to restrict out-of-state waste. State or local governments with pub111. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
113. The issue of "back-hauling," See supra note 7, has given rise to another possible
exception to dormant commerce clause analysis, the "quarantine exception;" Asbell v.
Kansas, 209 U.S. 251,256 (1908) (diseased livestock); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 589 (1888) (infected rags and intoxicating liquors); see also Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (ban on importation of live baitfish).
The "quarantine exception" is more like a "market-participant" exception in that it is
excluded from commerce clause scrutiny at the outset and it provides a more categorical
exception. The Supreme Court states that, if an article from "its nature...or it its condition is such" as to make it unfit for human consumption, then it its not a legitimate article
of commerce, and the state power may exclude its introduction. Bowman, 125 U.S. at
490. The constitutional principles that underly the commerce clause do not require the
state to sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversable environmental damage has occurred before it acts to avoid such consequences. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
In light of the fact that transporting foodstuff and consumer products in refrigerated
trailers and othe rigs used for garbage is unsanitary and potentially dangerous for human
consumption, a state may raise a plausible argument for a "quarantine exception" to the
commerce clause. However, in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, where the state banned
most garbage from outside the state, the Court found the "quarantine exception" inapplicable because New Jersey did not "even-handedly" impose upon its own garbage the
same restrictions it imposed on out-of-state garbage. 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978). The
Court in City ofPhiladelphia appeared to be reversing Bowman by interpreting the rationale of the decision as being a balancing of an article's worth as against its inherent dangers, rather than the more traditional reading of allowing exclusion of "innately harmful
articles." City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 632 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
One possible approach to restricting "back-hauling" is under a newly proposed house
bill, H.R. 3516, which regulates certain transportation of solid waste, and requires that
long distance garbage haulers have a signed contract with a disposal site before shipping
waste across state lines. H.R. 3516, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4011 (1987).
Section (b)of this bill, entitled, "standard of care," states that no person may transport
any solid waste across state lines or handle any solid waste incidental to any such transportation or handling." Id In terms of applicability to the .problem of backhauling, this
provision of H.R. 3516 comes close to addressing the problem. However, due to the potential gravity of the situation and the present lack of definitive case law or statutroy
authority under which one may restrict "back-hauling" practices, more specific regulation is needed.
114. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (commerce clause
allows states to send their wastes to other states whenever they feel it "expedient or necessary" to do so). cf Borough of Glassboro v. Gloucester County Bd., 100 N.J. 134, 495
A.2d 49, 56 cert., denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985) (the commerce clause was intended as a
shield against discrimination, not as a sword to obtain a preference).
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licly owned landfills can construct a highly complex waste processing
center and enter the market for landfill services, thereby becoming market participants in the solid waste landfill market."15
The federal government should take notice of the recent trend of lower
court cases that restrict out-of-state waste. Although states have a legitimate interest in safeguarding the interests of its citizens by providing
available landfill space, federal intervention is needed to ensure that the
states do not abuse their power to restrict out-of-state waste under the
market participant exception" 6 and balancing of interests test." 7
Bruce H. Aber
115. See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text. Excessive use of this exception
ignores the fact that the garbage problem is no longer a state and local issue, but rather a
national issue. States are more interdependent than ever before in this time of landfill
crisis. The problem lies in the fact that there do not appear to be any limits on how many
designated public lands a state can claim as being a "waste processing center" and
thereby become a market participant in the solid waste landfill market. This raises the
possibility that a state could own all the potential landfill sites within its borders, hoarding its natural resources. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1980). It also raises
the question of whether a monopoly over a finished product such as a complex process
(waste processing center) takes us outside the scope of Reeves, Inc. In Reeves, Inc., the
Court implied that a monopoly over state-owned resources within the state would not be
eligible for the market participant exception. Id. at 440.
117. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.

